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Hypothetical bias is the common finding that hypothetical monetary values for “goods”
are higher than real values. We extend this research to the domain of “bads” such as
consumer and household choices made to avoid aversive outcomes (e.g., insurance).
Previous evidence of hot-cold empathy gaps suggest food disgust is likely to be strongly
underestimated in hypothetical (cold) choice. Depending on relative underestimation of
food disgust and pain of spending, the hypothetical bias for aversive bad scan go in the
typical direction for goods, disappear, or reverse in sign. We find that the bias is reversed
in sign—subjects pay more to avoid bads when choice is real. fMRI shows that real choice
more strongly activates striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (reward regions) and shows
distinct activity in insula and amygdala (disgust and fear regions). The neural findings
suggest ways to exogeneously manipulate or record brain activity in order to create better
forecasts of actual consumer choice.
Keywords: hypothetical bias, aversive bads, fMRI, medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, decision making,
neuroeconomics
INTRODUCTION
Real choices are binding consequential commitments to a course
of action, like undergoing surgery or putting a down payment on
a house. Researchers in all social sciences seek to understand how
real choices are made. However, in studying decisions, scientists
and policy makers often have to settle for measuring hypothet-
ical statements about what people would choose, rather than
observing what people actually do choose.
In marketing research, for example, hypothetical surveys are
used to forecast sales of existing products, to test new products by
asking consumers what they would buy, and to evaluate promo-
tions (Silk and Urban, 1978; Urban et al., 1983; Infosino, 1986;
Jamieson and Bass, 1989; Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Chandon
et al., 2004; Raghubir and Greenleaf, 2006; Schlosser et al., 2006).
In public economics and political science, survey data are used
to establish the dollar value of goods that are not traded in mar-
kets (such as clean air or the prevention of oil spills), and to
poll likely voters before an election (Crespi, 1989; Diamond and
Hausman, 1994; Carson et al., 1996; Mortimer and Segal, 2008).
Hypothetical choices are also necessary in some types of psy-
chology and neuroscience experiments in which measuring real
choices is impractical or unethical, especially in the domain of
distressing moral choices (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Kühberger
et al., 2002; Hariri et al., 2006; Monterosso et al., 2007).
The reliance on hypothetical choice data presumes either that
hypothetical choices are a good and legitimate way to forecast
real choices, or that there is some knowable relationship between
the two types of choices, such that the hypothetical data can be
adjusted to forecast real choice data accurately.
Abbreviations: WTP, willingness-to-pay; CS, consumer surplus.
However, many studies in behavioral economics have shown a
substantial, systematic gap: typically, hypothetical valuations are
greater than real valuations (Cummings et al., 1995; Johannesson
et al., 1998; List and Gallet, 2001; Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002;
Little and Berrens, 2004; Murphy et al., 2005; Blumenschein et al.,
2007; Tanner and Carlson, 2009). To remedy this typical upward
“Yes” bias, in marketing research conjoint analysis using hypo-
thetical preference data has been extended and improved through
hybrid incentive-aligned methods in which an inferred choice will
be implemented for real (Ding et al., 2005; Ding, 2007; Dong
et al., 2010). In the moral domain, FeldmanHall et al. (2012a,b)
find that subjects say they will sacrifice more money to spare oth-
ers’ from mild electrical shocks than they actually do when the
shocks are real.
However, most of these studies comparing hypothetical and
real choices used appetitive goods, that is, goods to which peo-
ple assign a positive value. Our paper is only the second to
compare hypothetical and real economic valuations of aversive
“bads” (following FeldmanHall et al., 2012b). We do so using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The main goal
is to see whether there is distinct neural valuation during hypo-
thetical and real choices about aversive bads, with the hope that
knowing where those valuations are encoded would lead to new
predictions.
In our choice paradigm, subjects choose howmuch they would
pay to avoid having to eat a food that most people find unpleasant
(such as pigs’ feet, canned oyster, or a large dollop of spicy wasabi;
see Table A1 and Plassmann et al., 2010). Eating these foods is,
of course, not as dramatic as some naturally-occurring bads that
consumers must spend money or effort to avoid, such as regu-
lar colonoscopy screenings or protecting against identity theft.
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However, the advantage of using bad foods is that consenting
subjects can actually make these unpleasant real choices in a lab
environment. That is, at the end of the experiment they actually
eat one food if they don’t pay enough to avoid it. Having real
choices is crucial, of course, for the comparative study of real and
hypothetical choices. It is expected that initial clues from fMRI
during unpleasant decisions about bad foods will provide some
guidance regarding the neural valuation of more dramatic and
unpleasant aversive experiences.
Hypothetical measures are often used to judge the value of
aversive bads. One category of bads is environmental damage
(Carson et al., 2003; Loureiro et al., 2009; von Stackelberg and
Hammitt, 2009; Martin-Ortega et al., 2011). Another category
includes a public good that benefits society but harms a host loca-
tion, such as locating a prison or a toxic waste dump. In studies
of medical decision making, patients are often asked to choose
between hypothetical medical treatments that could involve seri-
ous side effects (Silvestri et al., 1998; Levy and Baron, 2005), or to
express valuations of those procedures in numerical terms such
as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (Zeckhauser and Shepard,
1976). In all these cases, it is difficult or impossible to compare
hypothetical choices with real ones.
Why are aversive choices interesting? Many everyday choices
require paying—money, as well as effort—to avoid unpleasant
and harmful events. Consider insurance. The purchase of a car or
earthquake insurance policy, an AppleCare service package, or an
alarm system does not have any appetitive value, per se; instead,
it is a payment to avoid future aversive events (similar to pay-
ing to avoid unpleasant food). Similarly, going to the doctor or
dentist, taking medicines with side effects, and dieting and exer-
cise, are (typically) aversive choices to prevent even worse future
outcomes. Political campaigns also use marketing tactics, to per-
suade voters to accept aversive tradeoffs (such as raising taxes
to eliminate California’s deficit, or cutting pensions in Greece).
Finally, many household purchases might be appetitive for one
household member but aversive for others (e.g., one spouse suf-
fering through a summer action movie, or a teenager dragged to
a bed-and-breakfast with her parents). If the unfortunate spouse
or teenager misforecasts how aversive the activity will really be,
during hypothetical planning, then our study could shed some
light on how to market such mixed-valence family activities. Our
results would have most direct application in situations where
decisions are made to avoid viscerally unpleasant outcomes like
pain. It remains to be tested whether they can generalize to less
visceral decisions like purchasing an extended warranty. We hope
that the present study inspires future research that extends to less
visceral domains of aversive choice.
Using fMRI in our study establishes tentative findings about
whether there are differences in neural circuitry in making hypo-
thetical and real choices involving aversive bads. Our data extend
the two previous fMRI studies on this topic, which used appet-
itive consumer goods (Kang et al., 2011) and distressing moral
choice (FeldmanHall et al., 2012b). Our paper also adds to emerg-
ing literature on consumer neuroscience (Knutson et al., 2007;
Plassmann et al., 2011, 2012; Yoon et al., 2012).
Behaviorally, comparing bads and goods could also illu-
minate the general mechanisms which create differences in
hypothetical and real choices. Note that evaluating goods requires
a comparison of the utility from a positively-valued appetitive
good with an aversive payment of money. A hypothetical bias
could result from either overvaluation of appetitive goods, or
undervaluation of the distaste of paying money, or both, dur-
ing hypothetical choice. Studying only appetitive goods cannot
discriminate which type of biased evaluation is occurring.
For aversive bads, overly positive hypothetical evaluation
(Tanner and Carlson, 2009) leads to underestimation of two dif-
ferent kinds of disutility—disutility from eating aversive foods
and disutility from paying money. If both are underestimated
during hypothetical choice, it is unclear which effect is likely to
be more dominant a priori, so the difference in hypothetical and
real choices is unclear. In fact, there are three possible hypotheses
about which effect could predominate and what the sign of the
hypothetical-real bias will be.
First, suppose that in hypothetical choice, there is a general
underestimation of how bad spending money is (as compared
to real payment), and further, that this underestimation is more
substantial than the error in the predicted disutility from the con-
sumption of bad food. Then in the aversive bads domain that we
study, real willingness-to-pay (WTP) will be lower in magnitude
(i.e., closer to zero payment) than hypothetical WTP. This result
would unify the findings for appetitive goods and aversive goods;
both could then be explained by an insufficient appreciation,
in hypothetical situations, for the distasteful spending of money
in real choices—the “pain of paying” (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1998). According to this hypothesis 1, dollar values are inflated
in hypothetical choice and are deflated toward zero when choices
are real (e.g., paying $100 is not too painful when it’s not real
spending, be it for goods or bads).
Second, an alternative and more plausible hypothesis 2 is that
in hypothetical choices, people will underestimate the aversive
experience of eating bad foods to a greater extent than they may
underestimate the pain of paying. Consider the extreme exam-
ple of eating a monkey brain (as in the movie “Indiana Jones”)
for real. For many people, this would cause an immediate visceral
response (e.g., nausea, feeling of disgust). And to be clear, disgust
is indeed a visceral, as in physiological, response. For example,
Harrison et al. (2010) found that ratings of disgust after watching
repulsive food videos led to stronger gastric stomach responses
and neural activity in the insula and thalamus.
In contrast, losing an abstract secondary reward, such as
money, is likely to elicit less visceral and more cognitive “pain”.1
In hypothetical choices that are purely cognitive and have no
binding consequences, the brain might make rapid and effortless
decisions without fully taking any visceral factors into account.
However, in real choices, visceral factors such as disgust are likely
to be weighed more heavily, especially for food choices.
The reasoning laid out above is consistent with “hot-
cold empathy gaps” (Kühberger et al., 2002). According to
1A referee pointed out that the pain of paying may be quite low in our
scenario, since the payments are only $0–4 out of a $50 endowment. The
hypothetical bias (and perhaps associated neural activity) could be reversed
if the dollar scale was much larger and the aversive bad was less viscerally
unpleasant, or mentally remote, as in a case like buying insurance.
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Loewenstein (1996, 2005), when making a decision, people
underestimate or ignore the effect of visceral factors (generally
aversive) such as thirst, fear, and craving for tobacco that are not
currently experienced. More specifically, when people are in an
affective cold state (e.g., not experiencing thirst or craving at the
moment), they do not accurately estimate how much such vis-
ceral states (hot states) will change their preference and behavior,
hence the term “hot-cold empathy gap.” For example, smokers
who were not having a craving for a cigarette underestimated how
much they would value a cigarette when they were later in a high
craving state (Sayette et al., 2008). A similar gap has been shown
for thirst and for embarrassing public performance (e.g., mim-
ing) (Van Boven and Loewenstein, 2003; Loewenstein, 2005; Van
Boven et al., 2005), in evaluations of impulsivity of others and
social pain (Nordgren et al., 2007, 2011), and in heroin addicts
(Badger et al., 2007).
A bigger hot-cold empathy gap for food disgust than for
money payment implies the opposite of the typical hypotheti-
cal > real bias for goods. For real bad-food choices, the aversion
to eating a bad food will be strongly adjusted upward and the
aversion to paying money will be adjusted upward, by a smaller
amount. Real valuations will then be higher than hypothetical val-
uations (i.e., realWTP> hypotheticalWTP), reversing the typical
hypothetical bias.
As far as neural activity, we expect that during real choice there
will be stronger neural activations in affective areas implicated
in disgust and fear processing, such as the insula and amyg-
dala (Whalen, 1998; Craig, 2002, 2009). That is, in this account
stronger affective reactions during real choice cause higher bids
to avoid eating the foods which are affectively unpleasant. This is
an important step because no previous study of hot-cold empa-
thy gaps has compared biological activity in hot and cold states,
and shown direct neural evidence consistent with an affective
(empathic, or emotional) difference. In addition, based on find-
ings in (Plassmann et al., 2010) we expect higher neural activity
in valuation regions such as medial OFC and ventral striatum,
when bids are lower. Since these are bids to avoid an unpleasant
experience, bidding low means the experience has less negative
value.
Note that alternatively, it is possible that affective reactions
are only prominent in the real choice when subjects bid a low
amount, so they have a high expectation of having to bid the
food. That is, in this alternative account, low bids cause stronger
affective reactions (rather than the other way around, as in the
previous paragraph).
The third and last hypothesis is that the aversion to bad food
and the pain of paying are equally underestimated (or not under-
estimated at all). In this scenario, it is predicted that there will be
no significant behavioral difference between real and hypothetical
valuations, and fewer neural differences in the two conditions.
The elements of these hypotheses can be mathematically sum-
marized as follows. Let w be an individual’s WTP to avoid bad
food, x pain of paying, and y disutility from consuming bad food.
And let (wr, xr, yr) and (wh, xh, yh) denote the levels of w, x, y in
the real and hypothetical conditions, respectively. Suppose thatw,
x, and y have a functional relationship, w = f (x, y).
Generally, a person will be less willing to pay to avoid aver-
sive bads if he feels more pain of paying. Likewise, all other
things being equal, he will be more willing to pay to avoid
bad food if the disutility from consuming it increases (e.g., he








Typical consumers are overly optimistic (Weinstein, 1980, 1987,
1989; Tanner and Carlson, 2009) and are thus expected, in hypo-
thetical situations, to misforecast (i.e., underestimate) the real
pain of paying as well as the real badness of consuming bad food.
This can be expressed as:
dx ≡ xh − xr < 0 dy ≡ yh − yr < 0 (2)
where dx and dy denote the changes in x and y between the
hypothetical and real conditions.
Given the above formalism, the change in hypothetical and real
WTP, denoted dw, can be written as:
dw ≡ wh − wr = ∂f
∂x
· dx + ∂f
∂y
· dy.
Note the signs of the terms on the right-hand side from Equations
(1, 2); the sign of dw (e.g., the relative size of hypothetical and real
WTP) is determined by the relative size of the terms on the right
as summarized in Table 1.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-seven subjects participated in the fMRI experiment
(10 females, 17 males; M ± SD age = 22.48± 8.96 years; age
range = 18–65). Eight additional subjects were excluded for the
following reasons: one subject could not finish the scanning due
to nausea; three subjects were excluded because their behavioral
data showed no variability; and four subjects were excluded due
to excessive head movement. All subjects were right-handed; had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision; had no history of psychi-
atric, neurological, or metabolic illnesses; and were not taking
medications that interfere with the performance of fMRI. Since
the study involved choice (and possible consumption) of foods,
all subjects were screened on arrival for any dietary restrictions
such as food allergies, diabetes, or any other medical condi-
tion or religious/ethical practices that may affect choice of foods
in any way.
Table 1 | Mathematical summary of the three hypotheses.
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STIMULI
Fifty aversive food items were used in the current study. Our food
stimulus set was based on the set generously shared by Plassmann
et al. (2010). Some of the least aversive foods (e.g., pears; about
20% of the original list) were dropped and replaced by new items
more consistently rated as unpleasant. The new items were avail-
able at local grocery stores and were chosen based on “disgust
ratings” provided by a group of independent evaluators (For a
complete list of foods in our stimulus set, see Table A1 in the
Appendix).
The food stimuli were presented to the subjects using color
pictures (72 dpi) on the computer screen during pre- and post-
scanning parts, and through MRI-compatible video goggles dur-
ing scanning. Stimulus presentation and response recording were
implemented in Matlab, using the Psychophysics Toolbox exten-
sions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007).
EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE
The experiment consisted of three parts—pre-scanning, scan-
ning, and post-scanning parts (Figure 1A). At the beginning of
the experiment, subjects were told that they would earn up to $50
for completing the experiment ($45 fixed plus $5 spending bud-
get), and were informed that there were three experimental parts.
FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. (A) Timeline of the entire experiment.
(B) Time course of an individual trial in the scanning part. The structures of
the hypothetical and real bidding trials were identical. All 50 food items
were repeated across the two bidding blocks. During the food image
presentation, subjects were asked to press any button as soon as they had
decided how much to bid. Subjects submitted their bid using a sliding scale.
The initial position of the bidding cursor (anchor) was randomized in every
trial in order to avoid any potential anchoring effects (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974).
Detailed instructions for each part were not given until each part
began. We intentionally did not counter-balance the order of the
hypothetical and real conditions in the scanner (following Kang
et al., 2011). We discuss this design choice in the discussion.
In the pre-scanning part, subjects were shown the 50 different
food images, one at a time and in random order. Subjects were
asked to rate each food item on how familiar they were with it,
using a scale from 0–3. The scale was defined as follows: 0 indi-
cated “have not heard of it and have no idea of what it is” (least
familiar); 1 “have not eaten the food shown, butmight have heard
of it and have some idea of what it is”; 2 “might not have eaten
it, but have heard of it and know what it is”; and 3 “have eaten
it and know what it is” (most familiar). We collected familiarity
ratings for the following reason: it is possible that subjects might
bid higher (not to eat) for the foods that they were less familiar
with (e.g., ambiguity aversion, Hsu et al., 2005), so the familiar-
ity rating was entered into the functional imaging data analysis to
control for any potential familiarity effect on neural activity (e.g.,
people value familiar items more).
The scanning part had two blocks of bidding tasks, each block
consisting of 50 trials—one for each food item. Both blocks were
identical except that the first was hypothetical and the second
block was real. Within each block, subjects were shown the same
50 food items as in the pre-scanning part, one in each trial, in
random order (Figure 1B).
At the start of each scanning block, subjects were instructed
as follows. They were told (to imagine in hypothetical block) that
at the end of the experiment, one out of the 50 trials would be
randomly selected by the computer and they would have to eat
the food shown on that selected trial. The only way they could
avoid eating the chosen food was to purchase the right not to eat
it, and they had to make a bid in order to buy this right. The right
to avoid the food was sold using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) auction mechanism (Becker et al., 1964; Plassmann et al.,
2007, 2010; Kang et al., 2011). The auction worked as follows:
Subjects bid one of $0, $1, $2, $3, or $4 in each trial. At the end of
the experiment, the computer determined the price for the right
and randomly selected one trial. Regarding the pricing, the com-
puter would randomly generate an integer between 0, 1, 2, 3, and
4 (each integer was equally likely), and this randomly generated
integer, say p, would determine the price of the right to avoid the
food. If the bid made by the subject for a given food item, say b,
was greater than or equal to p (b ≥ p), then the subject paid $p to
purchase the right, and did not have to eat the item. However, if
b < p, the subject had to eat the food shown (2–3 spoonfuls), and
did not have to pay anything (see Plassmann et al. (2007, 2010)
for the characteristics and limitations of the BDM auction). Note
the key difference between the hypothetical and real blocks: for
hypothetical trials, subjects were told to decide how much to bid
while imagining that they really may have to eat the food, whereas
in real trials, they knew they would have to eat the food when they
did not pay enough to avoid it.
After reading the instructions for the real scanning block and
prior to starting the block, subjects in the scanner gave an addi-
tional consent to actually eat the food. Subjects were made aware
that they could withdraw from the experiment anytime if they did
not want to continue and that in this case, they would still collect
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whatever they had earned up until that point. All subjects asked
to eat an aversive food, at the end of the experiment, did indeed
do so.
In the post-scanning part outside of the scanner, subjects were
asked to rate each of the same 50 food items on how appetitive
or disgusting they were to them. Ratings were entered with a slid-
ing scale from −3 through 3 (−3: very disgusting; 0: neutral or
indifferent; 3: very appetitive). This number is henceforth referred
to as a “disgust rating”—note that lower values indicate a higher
level of disgust.
The initial location of the anchor on the bidding scale was ran-
domized for each trial and recorded during the scanning session.
These data were used as a check for subjects’ engagement in the
task and possible anchoring effects. Correlations between sub-
jects’ bids and anchor positions were not significantly different
from zero for most of the subjects (Table A2).
IMAGING DATA ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
T2∗-weighted echo-planar images was acquired on a Siemens
3T Trio MRI scanner with a 12 channel coil (repetition time,
2030ms; echo time, 30ms; field of view, 192 × 192mm; flip
angle, 80◦; 32 axial slices; 3 × 3× 3mm in-plane resolution).
Images were obtained during two separate sessions of ∼12min
each. To improve functional sensitivity in orbital frontal areas,
each functional image was acquired in an oblique orientation
of 30◦ off the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line
(Deichmann et al., 2003). Slices were collected in an interleaved
ascending manner. The first three volumes in each session were
discarded to permit T1 equilibration. A high-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical image (1× 1 × 1mm) was also acquired
from each subject to facilitate localization and coregistration of
functional data. All of the statistical maps reported here were
rendered on the average of all subjects’ structural images.
fMRI data preprocessing and analysis were performed using
SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK). Functional images were slice-time corrected, motion cor-
rected with alignment to the first volume, spatially normalized to
the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template, and
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full width at half-
maximum, 8mm). Intensity normalization and high-pass tempo-
ral filtering (filter width, 128 s) were also applied to the data. The
anatomical T1 images were coregistered to the mean functional
EPI images for each subject and normalized using parameters
derived from the EPI images. To control for nuisance effects,
all regression models included six regressors indexing residual




We estimated the parameters of a general linear model (GLM)
for each participant to generate voxel-wise statistical parametric
maps of brain activation. The GLM assumed 1st-order autore-
gression and included the following regressors that capture
the main events in our experiment: H1 (hypothetical evalua-
tion modeled as a 0-s duration event at the onset of the food
image presentation in the hypothetical trials), H2 (a parametric
modulator of H1 indicating the hypothetical bid made by the
subject), H3 (a parametric modulator of H1 indicating familiar-
ity rating), H4 (a boxcar function denoting hypothetical bidding
phase), R1 (real evaluation modeled as a 0-s duration event at
the onset of the food image presentation in the real trials), R2
(a parametric modulator of R1 indicating the real bid made by
the subject), R3 (a parametric modulator of R1 indicating famil-
iarity rating), and R4 (a boxcar function denoting real bidding
phase). The regressors were convolved with a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function. The parameter estimates from this
1st-level analysis were then entered into a random effects group
analysis, and linear contrasts were generated to identify regions
that responded differentially to bids between the hypothetical and
real conditions.
REGION-OF-INTEREST (ROI) ANALYSIS
Region of interest analyses of how activity in regions identified by
the 2nd-level group analysis scaled with bids were conducted by
running an additional GLM. In this analysis, trials were grouped,
within each condition, according to the three levels of bids for
each subject, resulting in “Low,” “Mid,” and “High” bid trials.
The GLM thus had eight regressors of interest, including food
image presentations with “Low,” “Mid,” and “High” bids, bidding
phase for each of hypothetical and real conditions, and regres-
sors of no interest. All regressors of interest were modeled as
a boxcar function. The three levels of bids were defined as fol-
lows: for all of the subjects except for one, $0 was “Low,” $1
and $2 were “Mid,” and $3 and $4 were “High” bid; for one
subject, $2 was “Low,” $3 was “Mid,” and $4 was “High” bid
as this subject did not make any $0 or $1 bids in either con-
dition. The β coefficients resulting from this post-hoc analysis
were used to create the bar graph shown in Figures 3, 4. Note
that since the ROIs were selected from the GLM described in
the last paragraph, we fully expect these ROI-based analysis to
provide further evidence of real-hypothetical differences. That is,
the analyses are not independent. However, these GLMs do add
further information that is not available from the initial GLM
since they show the differences in signal change in three categories
of bids.
RESULTS
The first results compare hypothetical and real choices, and
associated response times (RTs) which provide clues about infor-
mation processing. The second set of results address differences in
neural activity established using fMRI, in both hypothetical and
real valuations.
BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL AND REAL
CONDITIONS
The average hypothetical bid and the average real bid for each
food were significantly correlated with each other across foods
(ρ = 0.91, p < 0.0001). Despite this very high correlation, there
are systematic differences between the hypothetical and real bids;
almost all of the average real bids (averaged across subjects;
M ± SD = 1.92± .55) were higher than the average hypotheti-
cal bids (M ± SD = 1.63± 0.53) for the same foods (Figure 2A;
t(49) = 9.22, p < 0.0001, paired two-sample t-test, two-sided).
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) Average bid by individual food item.
Each point represents an individual food item. The red solid line indicates
a robust regression line (real bid = 0.96· hypothetical bid + 0.35; p-values
for coefficients: slope < 0.0001, intercept = 0.0026). (B) Average bid by
individual subject. Each point represents an individual subject. The red
solid line indicates a robust regression line (real bid = 1.13·
hypothetical bid + 0.03; p-values for coefficients: slope < 0.0001,
intercept = 0.9207). In (A,B), the translucent blue line indicates a 45◦
line. (C) Average bid as a function of average disgust rating by trial
type. Each point represents an individual food item. Solid lines
indicate robust regression lines (real bid = −0.84· disgust + 1.27;
hypothetical bid = −0.77· disgust + 1.05; all regression coefficients
significant at p < 0.0001). Note that on the disgust rating scale,
−3 indicates “very disgusting” and 3 indicates “very appetitive”.
(D) Average bid as a function of familiarity rating by trial type. Paired
sample t-test, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.02, no asterisk = not significant.
Average bids by individual subject showed a similar pattern.
The average hypothetical and real bids for each subject were
highly correlated (ρ = 0.74, p < 0.0001), and the average real
bid (M ± SD = 1.92 ± 0.87) was significantly greater than the
average hypothetical bid (M ± SD = 1.63 ± 0.68) (t(26) = 2.60,
p = 0.015, paired two-sample t-test, two-sided). On average,
most of the subjects made real bids that were higher than their
corresponding hypothetical bids (Figure 2B).
Overall, subjects found the presented foods to be slightly
disgusting (average disgust rating, M = −0.77, SD = 0.87) and
familiar (average familiarity rating, M = 1.83, SD = 0.98). The
real > hypothetical bidding difference was also shown even
after controlling for disgust (Figures 2C, A1) and familiarity
(Figures 2D,A2). Even including disgust and familiarity controls,
real bids were $0.20 higher than hypothetical bids.
RTs during image presentation were significantly differ-
ent between hypothetical and real conditions, possibly due to
repeated exposure to the same stimuli (Hypothetical: M ± SD =
3.73 ± 1.41 s; Real: 3.38 ± 1.73 s; t(26) = 2.89, p = 0.008, paired
two-sample t-test, two-sided). In order to rule out the possibil-
ity that any neural difference between the two conditions was
due to a difference in RTs, we estimated an additional GLM
that was identical to the primary GLM except that RT was
entered as a modulator in addition to bid and familiarity rating.
However, the results from the two models did not substan-
tially differ, so we report only the results from a simpler model
without RT.
NEURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL AND REAL
CONDITIONS
The GLM using a simple treatment regressor (i.e., H1 − R1)
showed that there is generally more activation during hypothet-
ical bidding as compared to real bidding (see Table A3). This
is a surprising result and contrary to Kang et al. (2011), which
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reported more overall activity in real trials. However, since real
bidding in the current study was deliberately confounded with
experience (the real bids come later in the trial sequence) this
deactivation could be due to either the real vs. hypothetical
treatment, or to the general effect of stimulus experience and neu-
ral habituation reducing brain activity; this is a well-established
effect (Thompson and Spencer, 1966; Wright et al., 2001; Fischer
et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2004).
The more diagnostic and interesting analysis therefore focuses
on regions in which activity scales with bid amounts differen-
tially in hypothetical and real conditions. To find these regions
we looked for areas that correlated with bids in the real trials
more strongly than in the hypothetical trials. The analysis uses
the contrast R2− H2 (denoted [real × bid - hypothetical × bid]
below).
In this analysis, there was no brain region identified to be more
positively correlated with real bids than hypothetical bids, even
at a lenient value of p < 0.01 (uncorrected) with a small extent
threshold of 5 voxels. However, with the whole-brain analysis,
we identified regions where the BOLD signal was more nega-
tively correlated with real bids than hypothetical bids (Table 2,
Figures 3A, 4A, and A3). These areas include the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), thalamus, and insula. Most of these areas, including the
vmPFC, left amygdala, ACC, thalamus, and insula, are still signifi-
cantly different after correction using a false-discovery rate (FDR)
p < 0.05.
We previously found that for appetitive goods (consumer
products), the vmPFC is more strongly involved in valuation in
real decision making compared to hypothetical decision making
(Kang et al., 2011). That previous study, using appetitive goods,
did not find the amygdala to be involved in valuation. However,
the amygdala is thought to play a key role in processing of aver-
sive stimuli and aversive conditioning (among other functions)
(Whalen, 1998; Phelps, 2006; Johansen et al., 2010). Hence, we
further explored how bids appeared to be encoded in both vmPFC
and amygdala areas.
As Figures 3B, 4B show, the vmPFC and the amygdala areas
show a significant negative linear trend across different levels of
bids in real trials only; such a trend is not observed in hypothetical
trials. That is, less aversive goods (which subjects pay less to avoid
eating) activate the vmPFC and the amygdala more strongly than
more aversive goods, but only in real trials.
When the food disgust rating was used in place of dollar bids,
similar regions of brain activity are found (Figure A4). This find-
ing is important because it implies that economic valuation, per
se, is not fundamentally different than judgments of disgust, at
least for these types of aversive foods.
Lastly, we compared the areas that were parametrically modu-
lated by bids in the current study and with the areas modulated by
decision values of appetitive goods in the previous study by Kang
et al. (2011). Due to the lack of deactivation in the Hypothetical×
Bid contrast in the current study, we overlaid the areas that neg-
atively correlated with real bid in the current study and the areas
Table 2 | Areas showing deactivations in the difference of the parametric regressors (Real × Bid − Hypothetical × Bid).
Region Laterality BA Voxels MNI coordinates T
x y z
Cerebellum anterior LOBE L 178 −12 −36 −33 6.68†
Cerebellum L 46 −18 −63 −27 6.51†
Pons R 58 15 −27 −33 5.50†
Sub−lobar, thalamus, lentiform nucleus, insula R 13 210 21 −9 3 5.32†
Amygdala/hippocampus * 15 −9 −12 4.98†
Ventral anterior nucleus * 6 −3 6 4.84†
Sub−lobar L 101 −27 −24 6 4.72†
Thalamus * −18 −15 0 4.28†
Insula * −27 −21 15 4.08†
Middle occipital gyrus R 18/19 68 27 −87 9 4.64†
Inferior occipital gyrus L 51 −42 −84 −6 4.60†
Middle frontal gyrus, OFC R 16 21 27 −18 4.59†
Parahippocampal gyrus R 35 18 33 −15 −30 4.32†
Sub-gyral, temporal lobe L 5 −36 −6 −27 4.29
Anterior cingulate R 24/32 41 12 21 30 4.19†
Sub-gyral, temporal lobe, superior temporal gyrus R 21 15 39 −6 −18 4.09†
Amygdala L 7 −18 −3 −15 4.05
Superior temporal gyrus L 38 9 −36 6 −21 3.92
Anterior cingulate L 9/32 13 −12 30 15 3.90
Cingulate gyrus R 5 0 −15 42 3.73
Height threshold: t(26) = 3.67, p < 0.001 (uncorrected); extent threshold, k = 5 voxels. L, left; R, right. †Survives whole-brain FDR correction at p < 0.05; *part of a
larger cluster.
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FIGURE 3 | Frontal areas exhibiting higher negative correlation with
real bids than hypothetical bids. (A) Deactivations in the [real × bid −
hypothetical × bid] contrast (p < 0.001, uncorrected; threshold k ≥ 5
voxels). The color bar on the right indicates the t-score. (B) Average
response in the OFC area to different levels of bids by trial type. The OFC
mask was defined as a vmPFC area (peak at x = 21, y = 27, z = −18)
identified in the [real × bid - hypothetical × bid] contrast [the area with
crosshairs shown in the right panel of (A)]. β values extracted from this OFC
mask. ∗∗p = 0.016, no asterisk = not significant, paired two-sample t-test.
that were positively correlated with a real decision value of appet-
itive goods in the previous study (Figure A5). We found that the
vmPFC, ACC, and ventral striatum (VStr) appeared in both stud-
ies, but the amygdala and the surrounding areas only appear in
the current study of the aversive domain.
DISCUSSION
This study is the first to compare the willingness-to-pay to avoid
aversive consumption outcomes (unpleasant foods), in the two
conditions of non-binding hypothetical decision and binding
real decision. Previous studies with appetitive stimuli typically
find that hypothetical valuations are higher than real valuations.
We find the opposite result. Binding, real bids to avoid eating
unpleasant foods were larger than hypothetical bids. The within-
subject design provides good statistical power to show that the
real> hypothetical bias is highly significant across both foods and
subjects.
Before proceeding, it is useful at this point to squarely address
potential threats to the validity of our scientific inference from
the deliberate design choice to elicit both hypothetical and real
valuations of the same foods in a fixed order (i.e., two expo-
sures per food, hypothetical then real). We fixed this order out
of concern that eliciting real bids first would lead to a mental state
FIGURE 4 | Subcortical areas exhibiting higher negative correlation
with real bids than hypothetical bids. (A) Deactivations in the [real × bid
- hypothetical × bid] contrast (p < 0.001, uncorrected; threshold k ≥ 5
voxels). The color bar on the right indicates the t-score. (B) Average
response in the amygdala area to different levels of bids by trial type. Due
to continuous activations in surrounding areas, the amygdala mask was
defined as an intersection of the two following regions: (1) a right amygdala
area (local peak at x = 15, y = −9, z = −12) identified in the [real × bid -
hypothetical × bid] contrast [the area with crosshairs shown in the right
panel of (A)]; and (2) a 8-mm sphere centered at the local peak of the area
in (1) at x = 15, y = −9, z = −12. β values extracted from this amygdala
mask. ∗∗p = 0.015, ∗p = 0.034, no asterisk = not significant, paired
two-sample t-test.
for the second hypothetical block fundamentally different than
that in most lifelike situations where hypothetical judgments are
made.
Many studies have presented the same stimuli multiple times
(e.g., Fitzgerald et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009), and found con-
sistent signals. The biggest threat to validity when stimuli are
judged repeatedly is that the repeated judgments are artificially
consistent. However, any such effect could lower the capacity
of the design to detect a highly significant hypothetical < real
difference in willingness-to-pay; and yet, we do find such a dif-
ference. (Therefore, it is likely that a between-subjects design
could show a much larger difference, both neurally and behav-
iorally; FeldmanHall et al., 2012b used a between-subjects design
and found striking differences.) Furthermore, the biggest concern
with neural activity would be possible habituation of a neural sig-
nal. If there was habituation of neural activity to the foods over
time, we would expect the neural activity to diminish to the base-
line activity or (perhaps) be less value-sensitive for the real trials
that come after the hypothetical ones. However, we found just
the opposite, that is, stronger sensitivity of neural activity to the
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value, which is not consistent with the possibility of habituation.
And behavioral experiments using appetitive goods by Kang et al.
(2011) showed that there were real vs. hypothetical differences in
both possible treatment orders. Thus, we argue that the potential
risks from the within-subject design with fixed treatment order
are not strongly evident in the data. In addition, there are many
statistical benefits of repeating the same stimuli in the hypothet-
ical and real conditions. Doing so controls for nuisance variables
such as physical and psychological aspects of stimuli (e.g., color,
shape, experience, memory) that might be correlated with stimu-
lus value, but are not involved in the valuation of aversive stimuli
per se.
Returning to the scientific contributions of the current study,
the combination of results herein with earlier results from Kang
et al. (2011) (and many earlier behavioral studies showing pos-
itive hypothetical bias) rejects the hypothesis that real dollar
valuations are lower in general, i.e., for both appetitive goods and
aversive bads.
While this conclusion is tentative, it is important because a
popular theory about hypothetical bias is that people underesti-
mate the value of money when expressing hypothetical values. An
example is the influential report (Arrow et al., 1993) by a panel
of academic economists on how to best elicit and use “contin-
gent valuation” survey measures to establish reasonable prices for
non-market-traded goods and services (such as clean air). They
specifically “emphasize[d] the urgency of studying the sensitivity
of willingness to pay responses to. . . reminders of other things on
which respondents could spend their money.” The panel’s conclu-
sion followed from a conjecture that opportunity cost reminders
would lower hypothetical responses because disutility from mon-
etary payment is underestimated in hypothetical choice, so that
reminders would lead to better approximate real values (as shown,
in fact, by Knoepfle et al., 2009).
Our results do not support the idea of a general strong devalu-
ation of money during hypothetical valuation (for both appetitive
and aversive objects). Instead, the results lend tentative support to
a different hypothesis (hypothesis 2) mentioned in the introduc-
tion: aversive experience of visceral factors (i.e., disgust) is more
strongly underestimated in hypothetical choice than aversive
experience of more cognitive factors (i.e., paying money) because
people in an affectively “cold” state easily fail to appreciate the
influence of a “hot” visceral factor that is not currently experi-
enced upon their preference and behavior (Loewenstein, 1996,
2000, 2005). We call this the “visceral response underestimation”
hypothesis.
In valuing appetitive goods hypothetically, “overly optimistic
consumers” (Tanner and Carlson, 2009) would probably overes-
timate benefit from consumptions of goods and to underestimate
the pain of paying, leading to hypothetical values that are too
high. In valuing aversive goods hypothetically, disutilities from
both of spending money and eating unpleasant foods are gen-
erally expected to be underestimated. However, disgust of eating
unpleasant foods is likely to be stronger in real choice if there is
a tendency to more strongly underestimate the influence of the
more visceral factor. Our behavioral finding (higher WTP in real
choice) is consistent with this account.
The brain imaging results reported also support this account.
Stronger encoding of “better” valuation (i.e., lower bids to avoid
less aversive foods) during real choice is found in cortical regions
that are well-established to encode value (vmPFC, ACC, and
VStr). Notably, Plassmann et al. (2007, 2010) find that the vmPFC
encodes both increased value for appetitive goods, and decreased
distaste (a positive improvement) for aversive goods. Tom et al.
(2007) found a similar common encoding in the VStr and vmPFC
for both increased potential money gains and decreased money
losses.
Most importantly, we find more value-sensitive activity during
real choice in the insula, amygdala, and hippocampus. The insula
is thought to encode general emotional and visceral discomfort
(Craig, 2002, 2009), ingestive disgust (Harrison et al., 2010),
risk (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Mohr et al., 2010), and empathy
for pain (Singer et al., 2004, 2009; Bernhardt and Singer, 2013).
The amygdala responds rapidly to impending threat, creating
neural vigilance (among other functions) (Adolphs et al., 1998;
Whalen, 1998). The visceral response underestimation hypoth-
esis is consistent with these functional attributions, assuming
that anticipation of actually eating unpleasant foods is viscerally
uncomfortable or threatening, as compared to merely imagining
so as in hypothetical choice.
Keep in mind that insula and amygdala activity is stronger
for low-bid (i.e., less aversive) bad foods when choices are real.
This direction is also consistent with Plassman et al.’s (2010) find-
ing, that parahippocampal and insula activity is higher response
to lower bids to avoid unpleasant foods. Nonetheless, we would
not have been surprised by the opposite pattern—i.e., a stronger
emotional reaction to the worst foods that people would pay
the most to avoid eating. Given our somewhat surprising result,
we offer a speculative reverse inference about why the least-bad
foods generated the most insula and amygdala activity in real
choice (compared to hypothetical). The signal changes displayed
in Figure 4B seem to offer a clue. Note that in hypothetical choice,
bads which receive higher bids to avoid have higher amygdala
activity. Thus, in this “baseline” condition worse foods gener-
ate more amygdala reaction, as one might expect if amygdala is
reflecting vigilance or negative emotion. However, when the real
condition takes place, subjects now think about the prospect of
actually eating the foods. If they bid high they won’t have to
eat the food, and the amygdala reaction to the worst (high-bid)
foods is actually much lower than in the hypothetical condition.
Oppositely, the least bad (low-bid) foods are ones they are likely
to eat—but in the real condition only—since they bid low. We
speculate that the heightened amygdala activity encodes a reac-
tion not to the stimulus per se, but to the expected displeasure of
having to worry about “really” eating it. That is, part of the switch
from hypothetical to real evaluation is a switch from a subjective
emotional reaction to the food itself (in the hypothetical case), to
a reaction to the prospect of whether the food will have to truly
be eaten (in the real, low-bid case).
A way to test this hypothesis is to immediately display the
outcome of the BDM mechanism that determines whether the
food will be eaten or not, given their bid. If a person bids 3, for
instance, but the BDM draw if 4, then they did not bid enough
and will have to eat the food. If our reverse inference is cor-
rect, then when they are surprised at having to eat the food,
even after bidding so high, we will see a strong aversive signal in
amygdala (similar, perhaps, to the hypothetical-condition signal.
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This fMRI evidence of differential insula and amygdala activity
is new evidence of a biological encoding of a hot (real choice)-cold
(hypothetical choice) empathy gap, in the brain. FeldmanHall
et al. (2012b) also find more activity in amygdala during real
moral choice, compared to imagined hypothetical choice, and in
temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and right insula. The conver-
gent evidence of stronger activity in amygdala and insula in both
studies, in different domains of unpleasant choices (food and
pain administration) is encouraging, and invites further studies
to establish further robustness.
Speculation about visceral response underestimation also sug-
gests some potential ways to “de-bias” hypothetical choices for
future research. For example, it is known that the amygdala
responds to fearful or threatening stimuli such as a fearful face
(and even fearful eye whites only) (Whalen et al., 1998, 2004)
and electric shocks (Phelps et al., 2001). Insula also responds reli-
ably to exogeneous stimuli that are unpleasant. Hence, one future
direction is to manipulate amygdala or insula activity by using
such stimuli during hypothetical choice. The idea is that stimu-
lation of such regions by external stimuli might “fool” the neural
circuitry into making judgments as if it is in a hot state (as in clas-
sic arousal misattribution, e.g., Dutton and Aron, 1974). Inducing
an artificial hot state could produce hypothetical choices that are
better forecasts of actual real choices. Another direction is to tap
visceral urges during hypothetical valuation by having subjects
inspect and smell real aversive food items, facilitating them to
more easily integrate visceral factors into their hypothetical valua-
tions. A third direction is to manipulate the degree of imagination
exerted in the hypothetical case [an approach often used in eco-
nomic surveys and also in FeldmanHall et al. (2012a)] and see
how such treatments alter brain activity.
Note that in our study hypothetical bids are (significantly
different but) highly correlated with real bids, and that both
types of bids are also significantly correlated with disgust rat-
ings. However, despite such high correlation between the two
behavioral measures, there is much less neural activity during
hypothetical valuation than real valuation (Figures A3, A4). For
many purposes, knowing that real and hypothetical behavior
covaries strongly across stimuli is good enough to justify relying
on hypothetical choice as a guide (especially when real choices
are unethical, expensive, or otherwise problematic). However,
the weak neural response to bids in the hypothetical condition
suggests that researchers in social and consumer neuroscience
who want to understand real choices neurally could find that
purely hypothetical contexts generate weaker signals, and that
making choices real will often add statistical power (and fidelity).
There has been growing academic interest in applying machine
learning techniques to neuroimaging data in order to predict pur-
chase choices, using either a real choice or a hypothetical choice
paradigm (Grosenick et al., 2008; Tusche et al., 2010; Smith et al.,
2012). Although such effort has been somewhat successful (in
terms of accuracy rates), the findings of the current study suggests
that predictive models estimated using hypothetical data are lim-
ited in how well they can accurately predict real purchase choice
by how different the underlying neural circuitries are.
Finally, we note that many data about how people evaluate
aversive experiences are inherently hypothetical, rather than real,
particularly if the data are collected to pre-value or anticipate
potential averse events. An important domain is medical decision
making. Patients often read hypothetical scenarios regarding dif-
ferent stages of a disease and treatment toxicity in order to make
decisions about treatments (e.g., with end-stage cancer, choice
between chemotherapy that could extend life by 4 months with
severe side effects versus supportive care that could only alleviate
symptoms) (O’Connor et al., 1987; Malenka et al., 1993; Yellen
et al., 1994; Silvestri et al., 1998; Gurmankin et al., 2002; Levy
and Baron, 2005). Further, a physician, who is giving medical
recommendations, may need to put herself in the hypotheti-
cal situation of being in her patients’ minds (particularly for a
minor or an incapacitated patient). Cancer patients often say that
they would not want to receive grueling cancer treatments (e.g.,
chemotherapy) but then change their minds when they do get
cancer (Loewenstein, 2005). Further understanding of how the
brain makes both hot and cold (real and hypothetical)decisions
could guide people and societies to make these difficult decisions
more effectively.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1 | Average bid as a function of disgust rating (−3: very
disgusting; 0: neutral; 3: very appetitive) by trial type. Paired sample
t-test, *p < 0.02, no asterisk = not significant.
FIGURE A2 | Average bid as a function of average familiarity rating
by trial type. Each point represents an individual food item. Solid lines
indicate a robust regression line; real bid = −0.34 ·
familiarity + 2.54, hypothetical bid = −0.38 · familiarity + 2.29
(all coefficients significant at p < 0.05).
FIGURE A3 | Overlay of the areas exhibiting negative correlation with bids in real and hypothetical trials (overlay of the real × bid and
hypothetical × bid contrasts).
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FIGURE A4 | Areas exhibiting higher correlation with disgust rating in real and hypothetical trials (note that a lower disgust rating indicates a higher
level of disgust). (A) Overlay of the hypothetical × disgust and real × disgust contrasts, p < 0.001 (uncorrected). (B) [real × disgust - hypothetical × disgust]
contrast.
FIGURE A5 | Overlay of the deactivation map of the real × bid contrast and the activation map of the real ×mDV contrast in Kang et al. (2011). The
vmPFC, ACC, and striatum appear in both studies, but the amygdala only appears in the current study.
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Table A1 | List of 50 aversive food items used in the study.
Product name Product name
Anchovies Mock duck meat
Artichoke Mustard
Baby food (carrot) Onions
Baby food (chicken and rice) Oyster sauce
Baby food (green beans) Oysters
Baby food (lamb) Palms
Baby food (mac and cheese) Pickled jalapeno peppers
Baby food (squash) Pigs feet
Baby food (vegetables and beef) Plums






Clams Sesame chili oil
Corned beef Shrimp sauce
Fish sauce Spam bacon
Ginger crisp Spam spread
Graduate chicken sticks Spinach
Ham spread Squid
Horseradish Tabasco
Liver pate Thai green curry paste
Liver wurst spread Wasabi
Mackerel Wax beans
Most of the food items were canned or bottled, and the remainder of them
(e.g., butter or wasabi) were packaged in a small box or container. Hence, all
foods items were stored easily in the lab or the nearby office space.
Table A2 | Correlation between bids and anchors.
Correlation





























Std Err 0.030 0.025
The average correlations for hypothetical and real trials are not significantly
different (paired sample t-test, p = 0.471).
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01.
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 104 | 15
Kang and Camerer Hypothetical and real aversive choices
Table A3 | Areas showing activation in the contrast of hypothetical vs. real evaluation, identified by the whole-brain analysis [(hypothetical −
real) contrast].
Region Laterality BA Number of voxels MNI coordinates t
x y z
Caudate, sub-lobar L 40 −18 6 18 4.85
Superior temporal gyrus R 64 39 −45 3 4.42
Posterior cingulate L 31 75 −6 −57 12 4.39
Lentiform nucleus, putamen L 24 −27 −21 0 4.18
Inferior frontal gyrus R 33 33 33 9 4.16
Superior frontal gyrus R 8 15 18 48 51 4.06
Sub-lobar, amygdala L 48 −9 −6 −9 3.94
Amygdala * −21 0 −15 3.19
Medial frontal gyrus L 10/11 129 −3 57 21 3.85
Medial frontal OFC * 3 57 −6 3.15
Corpus callosum R 21 12 30 15 3.76
Middle temporal gyrus L 26 −60 −15 −15 3.72
Posterior cingulate R 51 15 −48 9 3.67
Parahippocampal gyrus * 9 −39 −3 3.14
Medial frontal gyrus, mOFC L 11 16 −3 36 −18 3.35
Inferior frontal gyrus L 31 −48 24 −6 3.34
Lateral OFC * −42 27 −15 3.31
Height threshold: t(26) = 2.78, p < 0.005 (uncorrected); extent threshold, k = 15 voxels. L, left; R, right.
∗Part of a larger cluster.
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